Bibliometrics-based heuristics: What is their definition and how can
  they be studied? by Bornmann, Lutz & Hug, Sven
 Bibliometrics-based heuristics: 
What is their definition and how can they be studied? 
 
Lutz Bornmann*+, Sven Hug**, & Julian N. Marewski*** 
 
All authors contributed equally. 
 
*Administrative Headquarters of the Max Planck Society 
Division for Science and Innovation Studies 
Hofgartenstr. 8, 
80539 Munich, Germany. 
Email: bornmann@gv.mpg.de 
 
**University of Zurich 
Evaluation Office 
Mühlegasse 21, 
8001 Zurich, Switzerland. 
Email: Sven.Hug@evaluation.uzh.ch 
 
***Université de Lausanne 
Faculty of Business and Economics 
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Bâtiment Internef 
1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. 
Email: julian.marewski@unil.ch 
+ Corresponding author 
  2 
Abstract 
Paradoxically, bibliometric indicators (i.e., publications and citation counts) are both widely 
used and widely criticized in research evaluation. At the same time, a common 
methodological and theoretical framework for conceptually understanding, empirically 
investigating, and effectively training end-users of bibliometrics (e.g., science managers, 
scientists) is lacking. In this paper, we outline such a framework – the fast-and-frugal 
heuristics research framework developed by Gigerenzer et al. [1] – and discuss its application 
to evaluative bibliometrics. Heuristics are decision strategies that use part of the available 
information (and ignore the rest). In so doing, they can aid to make accurate, fast, effortless, 
and cost-efficient decisions without that trade-offs are incurred (e.g., effort versus accuracy). 
Because of their simple structure, heuristics are easy to understand and communicate and can 
enhance the transparency of decision-making processes. We introduce three bibliometrics-
based heuristics and discuss how these heuristics can be employed in the evaluative practice 
(using the evaluation of applicants for funding programs as example). 
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A common practice in research evaluation is to present all available information about 
an institution, a research group, or a researcher to the decision makers. For example, when the 
University of Zurich (Switzerland) assesses an academic unit, comprehensive data on 
organization, resources, research, teaching, and services are compiled and made available to 
the external peers who evaluate the unit [2]. Such practices are based on the implicit 
assumption the “more information and analysis the better – ignorance stands in the way of 
good decision making“ [3]. However, an emerging body of research questions this 
assumption: in numerous domains of decision making, ranging from finance and crime to 
medical diagnosis and sports forecasting, complex, information-greedy procedures can be 
outperformed by heuristics. Heuristics are simple decision strategies that ignore information 
[4]. In doing so, they can aid to make accurate, fast, effortless, and cost-efficient decisions 
without that trade-offs are incurred (e.g., effort versus accuracy). Moreover, because they are 
simple, heuristics allow making transparent decisions that can easily be communicated to and 
be understood by and others. 
In this commentary, we discuss how such heuristics could be defined and empirically 
studied in the field of research evaluation. First, we will introduce the “science of heuristics” 
[4] and sketch out what questions could be answered when applying that body of work to 
evaluative bibliometrics (research evaluation based on publication and citation counts). 
Second, to further illustrate our proposal, we will describe three bibliometrics-based heuristics 
[BBHs, 5] and explain how such heuristics could be employed to evaluate applicants for 
funding programs. Third, we will delineate four objectives for studying heuristics in research 
evaluation. Fourth, we will outline future research on BBHs, pointing to other heuristics and 
methods to investigate them. 
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The science of heuristics and bibliometrics 
The UK Research Excellence Framework (REF) is, arguably, the most prominent peer 
review procedure on the institutional level. The REF assesses the quality of research in UK 
higher education institutions (see http://www.ref.ac.uk/). According to Pride and Knoth [6], it 
is “hugely time-consuming and costly to conduct”. For example, the 2014 REF panel for 
physics consisted of 20 members who had to assess 6,446 papers. Since each paper has to be 
assessed by two reviewers, each reviewer had to read, on average, more than 600 papers in 
less than one year. “If every panel member, worked every day for ten months, each member 
would need to read and review 2.14 papers per day to complete the work on time. This is, of 
course, in addition to the panelist’s usual full-time work load” [6]. The total costs for the REF 
2014 have been estimated at £246m [7]. 
Bibliometrics is a cost-efficient (though often criticized) alternative to peer review. 
Pride and Knoth [6] investigated the correlation between bibliometrics (citations in Microsoft 
Academic, MA) and peer review (Grad Point Average rankings) of 190,628 papers from 36 
disciplines submitted to the REF 2014. They found that citations strongly correlate with peer 
review judgments at the level of institutions and disciplines (up to coefficients of 0.8 for some 
disciplines). In addition, they demonstrated that citation data can predict peer review based 
institutional rankings in certain disciplines. Harzing [8] also analyzed data from the REF 
2014. She compared the REF scores of institutions weighted by staff numbers with the 
citations of the institutions’ publications from 2008 to 2013 in MA and found an almost 
perfect rank correlation. The high degree of prediction accuracy of citations found by Pride 
and Knoth [6] and Harzing [8] questions the use of expensive and time-consuming peer 
review processes. High correlations between bibliometrics and peer review were also found 
outside the REF [e.g., 9,10]. These results indicate that focusing on citation data only might 
not be a limitation in decision-making. Simple decision-making strategies are not necessarily 
less accurate than complex procedures, such as peer review. 
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The role of bibliometrics is particularly interesting in evaluation procedures in which 
peers are informed by indicators. How do peers use indicators in their judgments and how 
heavily do they rely on them? Could indicators partly or completely replace the judgment of 
peers? For example, the EMBO Young Investigator Programme – trying to support the best 
young researchers in the life sciences – requires that “applicants must have published at least 
one last author research paper in an international peer reviewed journal from independent 
work carried out in their own laboratory” [11]. Do the reviewers count the number of these 
papers for assessing the applicants and do they take the Journal Impact Factor (JIF) of these 
papers into account? Do they look at the h index of the applicants? Should they? Is the 
predictive power of bibliometric indicators so strong that peer review offers only marginal 
additional insights? 
These and similar questions can be answered through the lens of the fast-and-frugal 
heuristics research framework, originally introduced by Gigerenzer et al. [1] to the cognitive 
and decision sciences, and extended to multiple other areas since then [e.g., 12,13,14]. 
Heuristics can produce accurate, fast, effortless or otherwise smart decisions based on little 
information (hence fast-and-frugal). This has been shown in numerous computer simulations, 
mathematical analysis, and experiments [15,16]. The assumption is not that a given heuristic 
will yield accurate decisions in all situations. Rather, the art of smart decision-making consists 
of selecting the heuristic that fits a given decision environment. Indeed, a large body of 
empirical evidence suggests that people seem to draw from a repertoire (an adaptive toolbox) 
of simplifying, fast and frugal heuristics in many domains of decision making, ranging from 
business and medicine to sports and crime [4]. Bornmann and Marewski [5] discuss in detail 
that this may also hold true for research evaluation. 
Specifically, in exploring the potential of studying scientists’ and evaluators’ usage of 
heuristics in research evaluation as well as the performance of such heuristics, Bornmann and 
Marewski [5] introduce the notion of BBHs. These BBHs can exploit simple bibliometric 
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statistics, such as citation or publication counts. In doing so, they may significantly reduce the 
efforts and time for decision making in research evaluation. Moreover, since BBHs are based 
on simple computations (e.g., mean citations in the case of the JIF), they are easy to 
understand and apply. 
Research on BBHs does not ask whether bibliometric instruments are generally or 
always accurate and valid – as has been done in various critical statements on bibliometrics 
[e.g. 17]. Rather, analogous to the fast-and-frugal heuristics program, research on BBHs takes 
an ecological perspective and asks in which environment bibliometric instruments lead to 
satisfying judgements – and in which not. BBHs, as other fast-and-frugal heuristics, are 
conceived as adaptive judgement strategies that ignore information about some performance 
aspects (e.g., amount of third-party funds raised or assessments of single publications by 
experts), thereby allowing quick and robust decisions in research evaluation. 
Key to BBHs and other heuristics is the notion of uncertainty. Uncertainty is what 
characterizes decision making in the real world [18]. By definition, under uncertainty, not 
everything is known and surprises can occur. For example, not all possible courses of action 
or options, their outcomes, or probabilities of occurrence can be specified [see 19,20] [see 
21,22, for a discussion]. Heuristics are models for understanding and managing uncertainty. 
They can perform well even when time, information-processing capacities, and knowledge are 
limited. Heuristics work, because they exploit the statistical structure of information in 
decision makers’ environments and nestle into the workings of basic components of 
cognition, including the ways in which the perceptual and memory system encode, store, 
retrieve, and process information [23]. 
The fast-and-frugal heuristics research program thus stands in the tradition of Nobel 
Laureate Herbert Simon’s [24,25] work. Simon stressed that cognition is adapted to the 
structure of environments. Moreover, he put forward the notion of bounded rationality which 
holds that human information processing capacities are limited. In contrast, the economic 
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maximization models, which were dominant at Simon’s time, did not assume such bounds, 
but conceived rational decision making in terms of an exhaustive and complex process, 
characterized, for instance, by collecting and evaluating all information, weighting each piece 
of information according to specific criteria, and mathematically integrating that information 
to come to an “optimal” solution. Despite Simon’s critique, the unbounded rationality view 
and its remnants still can be found in science and society today and let people think that 
seemingly rational, exhaustive, information-greedy procedures always outsmart simple 
heuristics. Such thinking might fuel the view that complex research evaluation methods are 
generally to be preferred over simpler ones (e.g., simple bibliometric indicators). The 
consequence may be a missed opportunity: like other “mortals” [see 26], research evaluators 
do not have unlimited information-processing capacity, time, and knowledge. The science of 
heuristic applied to research evaluation might uncover ways of how to deal with such 
constraints. In the following, we will present two BBHs that could be employed for selecting 
candidates for a fellowship program (such as the EMBO Young Investigator Programme). 
Models of bibliometric-based heuristics: Selection of applicants to fellow-ship programs 
The one-cue BBH and the one-reason BBH are meant to be applied in the pre-selection 
and final selection of applicants. The two BBHs focus only on two dimensions: publications 
and citations. These BBHs implement lexicographic, non-compensatory decision processes, 
which are defined as follows [27]: “A decision is made lexically when a subject chooses A 
over B because it is judged to be better along a single, most crucial dimension, without regard 
to the other ‘compensating’ virtues that B might have relative to A. Thus, for instance, one 
would have chosen some restaurant A over B in a lexical fashion if one chose it because it 
were cheaper and did not care about other trait, like its quality, proximity, level of service, 
and so on” (p. 8). Lexical decisions are particularly suitable in uncertain situations, such as 
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research evaluation which is characterized by the lack of knowledge about all consequences 
of decisions and probabilities of “correct” decisions [see 28]. 
Experts, who know which dimensions of a task are most important, seem to make 
decisions in a non-compensatory way. Betting on just the most important dimension is not a 
bad thing to do. The non-compensatory take-the-best heuristic [29], for instance, has been 
found to make more accurate predictions than complex information-integration models (e.g., 
multiple regression) across 20 different task environments from psychology, sociology, 
demography, economics, health, transportation, biology, and environmental science [see 
15,16,30]. Moreover, in many environments, the use of such heuristics can be a response of 
decision makers to situations where complex and frequent decisions need to be made but 
capacities and resources are limited. 
As described by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier [4], heuristics consist of three building 
blocks: (1) search rules specify where to search for information, (2) stopping rules specify the 
end point of a search, and (3) decision rules specify how the final decision should be made. 
These rules can be flexibly used to shape an assessment process. 
One-cue BBH 
Akin to other heuristics of consideration set generation [e.g., in consumer choice or 
probabilistic inference; see 31], the search, stopping, and decision rules of the one-cue BBH 
select, in a first step, from a pool of applicants the most promising candidates whom a peer 
review panel has, in a second step, to assess in detail. In pruning down candidates to a smaller 
consideration set [32] of promising ones this heuristic reduces the complexity, and in so 
doing, also the monetary costs of the evaluation procedure. 
This elimination process is based on a single indicator which targets an important goal 
of the funder: research excellence. The three building blocks for the one-cue BBH read as 
follows: (1) Search all papers (only articles and reviews) published by an applicant in the Web 
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of Science (Clarivate Analytics). Find all publications in the database and send the publication 
list to the applicant for validation. (2) If questionable publications can be either included in or 
excluded from the applicant’s publication list, then the list is validated and finalized. Then 
determine which publications from the list belong to the 10% most frequently cited papers in 
the corresponding subject category and publication year in the Web of Science (highly cited 
papers). (3) Sort the applicants by the number of highly cited papers in descending order and 
select the top x% of the applicants (i.e., those who need to be discussed by the peer review 
panel). This BBH takes into account the number of publications and their quality (measured in 
terms of citation impact). 
The one-cue BBH can be formalized as follows [the formalizations are based on 33]: 
Compare the performances of several applicants,  P(1), P(2), P(3), … , P(m) using indicator i, 
with i(1), i(2) , i(3), … , i(m). Suppose that x applicants can be selected. The applicants are 
sorted by i in descending order. If the rank position of P(m) <= x, P(m) is selected for panel 
discussion; if P(m) > x, the applicant is not selected. 
One-reason BBH 
Suppose that there are two applicants who performed very similarly in the past and the 
experts in the peer review panel have difficulties in selecting one of them for funding. In these 
situations, random selection has been proposed as selection mechanism [34]. One issue of 
random selection are the expectations of the applicants: applicants assume that decisions are 
based on scientific or meritocratic criteria only. Scientific and meritocratic selection could be 
ensured if bibliometric indicators are used as reasons in decision making (e.g., number of 
highly cited papers, number of collaborating authors, number of single-author publications, 
number of papers in reputable journals). For example, a one-reason BBH could be formulated 
to prevent random selection: (1) Select a reason (e.g., number of highly cited papers) and look 
for the corresponding scores of both applicants. (2) Compare the scores of the two applicants. 
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(3) If they differ substantially, stop and choose the applicant with the better score. (4) If the 
applicants do not differ, return to the starting point of this loop (step 1) and look for another 
reason (e.g., number of papers in reputable journals). 
Similar to the stopping rule implemented in the take-the-best heuristic, the one-reason 
BBH bases an inference on the first indicator that discriminates between the applicants, that 
is, on the first indicator for which one applicant has a significantly better score than the other 
[29]. Different search rules can be implemented. A simple option is to select the indicators 
from a bibliometric report about applicants randomly one by one [3]. This search rule 
corresponds to the one implemented in the minimalist heuristic [35]. A more elaborate search 
rule akin to that of the take-the-best heuristic could be used, in which the indicators are 
ordered by their importance for the specific objectives of the funding agency. If the goals are 
research excellence (first goal), high degree of collaboration (second goal), and 
interdisciplinary research (third goal), the selection starts with the number of highly cited 
papers, followed by the number of collaborating authors, and ends with the number of subject 
categories to which publications have been assigned. 
The decision process of such a one-reason BBH can be formalized as follows [the 
formalizations are based on 33]. We compare the performances of two applicants: P(A) and 
P(B). The bibliometric report about P(A, B)  contains indicators i1, i2, i3, …, im. The scores of 
the indicators on applicant A are symbolized by i1(A), i2(A), i3(A), … , im(A) and the scores for 
applicant B by i1(B), i2(B), i3(B), … , im(B). Then, the decision rule of one-reason BBH is as 
follows: 
Infer P(A) > P(B) if and only if im(A) > im(B), 
where in(A) = in(B) for all n < m. 
Thus, indicators are inspected one at a time until an indicator is found that has 
different scores for the two applicants. The applicant with the higher score on this indicator is 
inferred to have the higher performance. 
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To compare the one-reason and one-cue BBH to more complex non-heuristic 
strategies, consider, for example a linear model which is used in university rankings [the 
formalizations are based on 33]. Suppose we compare the performance of two universities 
P(A) and P(B) using several (bibliometric) indicators i1, i2, i3, …, im. The indicators used in 
university rankings are usually combined based on specific weights w1, w2, w3, …, wm. 
Infer P(A) > P(B) if and only if 
∑𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑚
𝑚
(𝐴) >∑𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑚
𝑚
(𝐵), 
where wm ≥ 0. 
In this linear model a weighted sum of indicator values is calculated for each 
university and the university with the higher sum is inferred to have the higher performance.1 
Since university rankings consist usually of a multitude of indicators, decisions based on 
linear models are usually expensive. For example, based on the scientometric literature it has 
to be worked out which indicator to include in the ranking and which weight should be 
assigned to each indicator. 
Four objectives for studying bibliometric-based heuristics 
Although the use of fast-and-frugal heuristics has never been studied empirically in the 
area of research evaluation [except for 3], a large body of experimental, simulation, and 
mathematical work suggests that heuristics can aid in inference, categorization, choice, and 
search tasks that are structurally similar to those faced in research evaluation [e.g., 14,18,38]. 
We think that adapting the fast-and-frugal heuristics research program to evaluative 
bibliometrics would be particularly useful, since such a move could base the (critical) 
discussion about bibliometric indicators on a conceptual ground [5]. In line with the goals of 
                                                 
1 A weighted-linear strategy can be converted into a heuristic. One such heuristic is tallying (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996) also referred to as unit-weight linear model: All indicators are simply weighted equally, e.g., 
with 1; see 36. Dawes RM, Corrigan B (1974) Linear Models in Decision Making. Psychological Bulletin: 95-
106. and 37. Einhorn HJ (1975) Unit Weighting Schemes for Decision Making. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance 13: 171-192.. 
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research on other heuristics, an exploration of BBHs would have, at least, three objectives 
[see 39]. 
(1) The first one is descriptive and asks which BBHs researchers and other decision 
makers use in research evaluation. What are the BBHs that evaluators rely on and how have 
these BBHs been acquired? Such descriptive questions concern the adaptive toolbox, which 
contains different heuristics decision makers can select from in order to adaptively respond to 
different decision situations [23]. For example, the adaptive toolbox for the decision 
procedures of a fellowship program could include a one-cue BBH and a one-reason BBH as 
first and last steps. 
(2) The second objective is ecological. In what environment does it make sense for 
researchers and other decision makers to use which heuristics? This question concerns the 
ecological rationality of BBHs. The study of ecological rationality asks in which environment 
each heuristic performs well with respect to accuracy, frugality, speed, or transparency of 
decisions making and when specific heuristics will fail [40]. Work on the ecological 
rationality of BBHs would similarly examine in which contexts a certain BBH yields, for 
instance, accurate and effortless decisions and when that BBH will fail. This ecological line of 
research would thus focus on the quality of decisions with BBHs in given task environments – 
for instance, in the context of fellowship programs: When does focusing on the number of 
papers in reputable journals lead to satisfying recommendations regarding successful 
researchers in their later careers? In these task environments, how do BBHs perform 
compared to other methods of selection, for example, to how experts from a field assess the 
papers of applicants? 
(3) The third objective concerns research methods: how can people’s reliance on 
heuristics and their performance be studied? Descriptive research on heuristics typically 
makes use of experimentation and field studies to uncover what models of heuristics predict 
behavior [e.g., 41] and which ones not [e.g., 42]. Rather than merely focusing on the 
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outcomes of decision making (e.g., using regression models to estimate effects), descriptive 
work on heuristics also examines in how well process data (e.g., reaction times, or eye 
movements) is in line with the cognitive processes assumed by a given heuristic [e.g., their 
search, stopping, and decision rules; see 43,44]. Prescriptive work uses computer simulations 
and mathematical analyses to explore in which environments relying on those heuristics will 
likely yield accurate, fast, or otherwise clever decisions and when not [45,46]. Corresponding 
work for BBHs would develop similar methods to investigate BBHs. For example, research 
evaluating how accurate BBHs are for making inferences (e.g., about scientific quality) and 
forecasts (e.g., about future scientific impact) would test the performance of BBHs out of 
sample (or out of population), just as in research on take-the-best and other heuristics [e.g., 
16]. 
Outlining future research on bibliometric-based heuristics: models and methods 
In this comment, we focused on BBHs that select applicants of a fellowship program. 
However, other decision strategies from the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework could be 
relevant for the field of research evaluation, too. We close this commentary by offering a 
snapshot of two such heuristics: hot-hand and recognition. 
From hot hands to hot streaks 
According to Raab and Gigerenzer [28], the hot-hand heuristic has its origin in sports. 
It “reflects the hot-hand belief held by many athletes, coaches, and fans that a player who has 
just scored two or three hits in a row has a higher chance of scoring again than if that player 
had just had two or three misses in a row”. This heuristic has its correspondence in science in 
the hot streaks phenomenon described by Liu et al. [47]. The hot streak “highlights a specific 
period during which an individual’s performance is substantially better than his or her typical 
performance” (p. 396). Liu et al. [47] investigated the publication records of about 20,000 
researchers. They considered not only the publication output of the researchers, but also the 
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impact of their publications (in terms of citations). The results of the study reveal that hot 
streaks in scientific careers exist (usually one, sometimes several): “The hot streak emerges 
randomly within an individual’s sequence of works, is temporally localized, and is not 
associated with any detectable change in productivity” [47]. The consideration of hot streaks 
in research evaluations is important, since they drive the overall individual performance. 
Their ignorance may lead to on over- or under-estimation of researchers’ scientific potential. 
Ignorance-based research evaluation 
The recognition heuristic has been described by Goldstein and Gigerenzer [48] as 
follows: “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, infer that the recognized 
object has the higher value” (p. 76). When people rely on this heuristic, having less 
knowledge is better than more – with this heuristic, ignorance supports good decision making. 
Interestingly, this heuristic has already been studied in the area of research evaluation. 
Hertwig and Todd [3] interviewed some Americans and Germans who were familiar with the 
academic sector of their own country. Both groups should indicate which of the 50 highest-
ranked American liberal arts colleges they recognized (listed in the US NEWS reference 
ranking). The results has been interpreted by the authors as follows: “What this means is that 
if we had asked our participants to choose higher-ranking colleges out of pairs of college 
names, the Germans could have used the recognition heuristic to pick those they recognized 
over those they did not, and this would have resulted in reasonably good choices (58 percent 
correct). In contrast, the Americans, who recognized most college names, would have made 
fewer good choices (54 percent correct)” [3]. The Americans could not rely on the recognition 
heuristic: They had heard of too many of the names. In contrast, the Germans, who were more 
ignorant and recognized fewer of the university names, could rely on this simple and accurate 
heuristic, this way boosting their performance. 
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The recognition heuristic and related memory-based heuristics [e.g., 49] may also 
represent simple models for studying citation and selection decisions [50]: when and to what 
extent are citations driven by familiarity with an author’s name, and which selection decisions 
(e.g., in fellowship applications) are influenced by, for instance, an evaluator having heard of 
the name of an eminent referee (letter of recommendation writer) before? 
Conclusion 
To conclude, if we assume that researchers employ simple bibliometric shortcuts (i.e., 
BBHs) to reach decisions in research evaluation, one has to investigate how researchers use 
BBHs and how successful BBHs are in different evaluative settings. Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
[51] point out that “heuristics per se are neither good nor bad. They can be evaluated only 
with respect to the environment in which they are used. The more functional the match is 
between a heuristic and the environment, the higher the degree of ecological rationality of the 
heuristic. The functionality of this match is verifiable by the extent of its success rather than 
fulfillment of coherence requirements” (p. 367). Since evaluative settings and indicators 
change continuously, evaluation practices should be studied in certain time intervals to 
identify new BBHs (including new or improved indicators) and to test how they perform 
compared to established heuristics. For studying and evaluating heuristics, Marewski et al. 
[40] recommend four principles: (i) Specify precise formal (i.e., computational or 
mathematical) models of heuristics. (ii) Test those models of heuristics comparatively against 
other (e.g., more complex) models in order to identify better models of behavior. (iii) Test 
heuristics continuously in new environments. (iv) Test heuristics in real world situations [e.g., 
41]. We think that those principles could also inform the study of BBH. 
In short, with this commentary, we neither advocate nor condemn bibliometrics for 
research evaluation. Yet, bibliometrics are often criticized for being reductionist in research 
evaluation. We think it is time to ground that debate in a conceptual framework. After all, it 
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is, perhaps, only once we begin to explore the toolbox of heuristics used in research 
evaluation that we start to grasp how reductionist bibliometrics really are. 
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